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Since 2005, the world has faced several public health emergencies of international concern arising from
infectious disease outbreaks. Of these, the COVID-19 pandemic has had by far the greatest health and eco-
nomic consequences. During these emergencies, responses taken by one country often have an impact on
other countries. The implication is that coordination between countries is likely to achieve better outcomes,
individually and collectively, than each country independently pursuing its own self-interest. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, gaps in multilateral cooperation on research and information sharing, vaccine develop-
ment and deployment, and travel policies have hampered the speed and equity of global recovery. In this
Health Policy article, we explore how multilateral collaboration between countries is crucial to successful
responses to public health emergencies linked to infectious disease outbreaks. Responding to future global
infectious disease threats and other health emergencies will require the creation of stronger mechanisms for
multilateral collaboration before they arise. A change to the governance of multilateral institutions is a logical
next step, with a focus on providing equal ownership and leadership opportunities to all member countries.
Europe can be an example and advocate for stronger and better governed multilateral institutions.
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In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) revised its Inter-
national Health Regulations, taking account of lessons from the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pandemic of 2002-3.
Henceforth, WHO could declare a public health emergency ofinternational concern (PHEIC) and has since done so six times: the
H1N1 influenza pandemic (2009), twice for Ebola outbreaks in sev-
eral parts of Africa (2014 and 2018), the ongoing polio epidemic
(2014), Zika (2015), and COVID-19 (2020). The last of these has had
by far the largest global health and economic impact. Since 2005, we
have also witnessed the re-emergence or rapid spread of established
infectious diseases like dengue, cholera, and measles.
These outbreaks have been characterised by the way that actions
taken by one country have had substantial consequences for others
[1]. This suggests that international coordination when responding to
such outbreaks brings greater overall benefits than each country
independently pursuing its own self-interest.
In this Health Policy article, we examine the case for multilateral
collaboration on threats from infectious disease. While recognising
that there are many perspectives we could adopt, including those
from the international relations literature, we begin with the eco-
nomic case for collaboration, looking at two types of goods with
Table 1
Scorecard showing global successes and shortcomings in the multilateral response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Domain Successes Shortcomings
Research collaboration and information sharing  Sharing of information by researchers
 International research collaborations
 Public data repositories
 Many regions and countries slow to learn policy les-
sons from elsewhere
 Lack of systemic global research governance
 Duplication of research studies
Vaccine discovery and development  Multinational initiatives to fund efforts such as the
Coronavirus Global Response and the Coalition for Epi-
demic Preparedness Innovations
 Approval of vaccines and adjuvants
 Establishing the principle of equitable vaccine distribu-
tion through the COVAX Facility (despite failures in
implementation)
 Most funding from national efforts
 Most vaccine doses secured by rich countries through
bilateral deals
 Trade barriers around vaccines and raw materials
Travel policies  Travel restrictions delayed spread from China in early
2020
 Dissonant COVID-19 response policies between highly
connected nations
 Restrictions on travel to countries of high COVID-19
incidence contribute little to control in these countries
2 M. Jit et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 9 (2021) 100221substantial inter-country effects: shared knowledge and population
immunity. Next, we explore the case for one type of international col-
laboration, multilateralism, as a means to achieve an optimal out-
come. We then examine its application in several areas: research and
data sharing [2], vaccine development and distribution [3], and inter-
national travel [4]. We use a scorecard to show the strengths and
weaknesses in the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic
(Table 1), and draw lessons for future multi-country collaboration,
particularly across Europe.2. Externalities and global public goods
An economic case for action can be built on the principles of exter-
nalities and public goods. An externality is a positive or negative
effect that falls on one party due to the action taken by another. For
instance, someone whose actions lead to contracting an infection
may impose negative externalities on the person’s close contacts by
transmitting the infection to them. Externalities are associated with
market failure; the externalities of one person’s consumption of a
good will not be reflected accurately in the price they are willing to
pay for it. Hence externalities are often used to justify government
intervention, such as taxes, subsidies, and regulations. When those
affected live in different countries, these are cross-border externali-
ties, requiring international coordination to correct market failures.
For instance, consumption of COVID-19 vaccines in one country may
prevent the emergence of variants that could cause disease else-
where.
Externalities are often associated with goods that are non-exclud-
able, i.e. if some people are able to consume those goods, then others
cannot be prevented from doing so. If a good is non-excludable, then
producing it generates positive externalities (increasing its supply to
everybody) while consuming it generates negative externalities
(decreasing its supply to everybody). However, negative externalities
in consumption are not generated if the good is also non-rivalrous, i.
e. it can be used by everyone without reducing its availability to
others. Goods that are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous are
called public goods, and if everyone in the world has access to them,
they are global public goods. A classic example of a public good is
street lighting.
Emerging infectious diseases are associated with two important
global public goods—shared knowledge and population immunity:
Shared knowledge. Information about an emerging infection is
crucial to enable countries to prepare and mount public health
responses, particularly in the early days of an outbreak [5]. As pre-
vention and treatment technologies are developed, knowledge about
their safety, efficacy and production mechanisms brings benefits
globally. However, not all countries in the world have surveillanceand data analytic infrastructure to collect all these data. Indeed, a sin-
gle country as the sole unit of analysis is often insufficient to establish
which measures are effective during a global health crisis. Pooling
resources across countries could enable the most important informa-
tion to be generated and shared as early as possible. This knowledge
is non-rivalrous but potentially excludable: people who have knowl-
edge can still withhold it from others through non-disclosure or
intellectual property barriers. If the knowledge is instead shared or
made available to all, then it becomes a global public good [6].
Population immunity. If one country controls infection through
vaccination, testing/quarantine, or non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions, this is likely to reduce infections elsewhere. This may also cur-
tail the emergence of variants that are more transmissible, cause
more severe disease, and/or can evade natural or vaccine-induced
immunity [7]. Countries with good infection control may be able to
relax non-pharmaceutical interventions, which can stimulate pro-
duction, demand and international trade. If a country has strong
travel connections with other countries that have higher infection
prevalence, it may try to prevent disease spread through travel
restrictions, but restrictions that are sufficiently stringent to reduce
infection spread may impact negatively on economic growth [8].3. The case for multilateralism
Countries can collaborate in different ways. The simplest arrange-
ment is bilateral, where one country reaches an agreement with
another, often a neighbour. This is appropriate where the subject of
the agreement is highly specific, such as the management of traffic
on a waterway they share. However, when multiple countries are
involved, as with trade in particular goods, it is inefficient as each
country must invest in complex negotiations with many others, repli-
cating the process each time. More often, groups of countries will
seek to reach multilateral agreements [9]. These can be topic specific,
such as trade or the environment, or more general.
Multilateral relations have three characteristics. First, they are
indivisible. All parties are treated equally. For example, outside cer-
tain arrangements such as those provided for by the European Union
(EU), each member state of the World Trade Organisation must offer
the same terms to all others. Second, there is an expectation of diffuse
reciprocity. In other words, while one party may derive greater bene-
fit than the other in a particular transaction, these will even out over
time. Third, there is some form of dispute resolution to ensure com-
pliance with what has been agreed.
The growth of multilateral agreements since the Second World
War testifies to their perceived value, both to small countries that
can achieve greater influence by working together and to large coun-
tries that often have the outsized influence on rule-setting. However,
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may elicit opposition from some national politicians. However, in a
world that is increasingly governed by multilateral agreements, the
cost of being outside the system, in terms of access to the global econ-
omy, can be high. In those areas where the cost of unilateral action is
greatest, such as nuclear or chemical weapons proliferation, most but
not all governments have been willing to accept the benefits of pool-
ing their sovereignty.
The situation has become more complicated in recent decades
by the growing power of nonstate actors, some of which have
greater power than many nation-states. They exist both in the
commercial sector (e.g. pharmaceutical corporations) and in the
philanthropic sector (e.g. the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). A
number of public-private partnerships have emerged, such as
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
The advantages of multilateral cooperation are evident but often
difficult to achieve. Frieden and colleagues [10] identified four rea-
sons for this difficulty, related to the production of global public
goods: (i) creating a shared vision of global public goods is challeng-
ing and requires cooperation; (ii) governments face complex domes-
tic challenges, leaving them little capacity to address longer-term
global commitments to produce global public goods; (iii) different
governments pursue different objectives; e.g. they may share the
goal of combating a pandemic but differ substantially in their secu-
rity, financial, or industrial goals; and (iv) previous failed initiatives
have left governments sceptical about the ability of the international
community to deliver global public goods.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted weaknesses in the exist-
ing multilateral system, set out in an independent panel report [11].
The initial pandemic response was slow, reflecting failings in the
application of the revised International Health Regulations and lack
of urgency by both countries and WHO. Global leadership coordina-
tion was inadequate, and there was lack of investment in pandemic
preparedness. A PHEIC declaration did not directly lead to the provi-
sion of the financial resources needed. These failures suggest that
new mechanisms may be needed to complement existing pandemic
response structures, perhaps based on the measures taken by the
G20 in the aftermath of the 2009 global financial crisis. There is also
scope to harmonise international practice, such as research stand-
ards, through agreements between civil society organisations and
other non-state actors. An example is the development of global
requirements for phase 3 trials of medicines and vaccines under the
umbrella of the International Coalition of Medicines Regulatory
Authorities [12]. Looking ahead, it is likely that there will be several
changes to the global health architecture, possibly including a new
pandemic treaty and additional international collaborative mecha-
nisms to promote preparedness and coordinate responses. In the fol-
lowing sections, we explore what those developments might look
like in three key areas.
4. Research collaboration and information sharing
International collaboration around research on COVID-19 and
similar threats has been characterised by an interplay between “sci-
entific globalism” (seeking open and collaborative science to advance
knowledge and address joint challenges) and “scientific nationalism”
(seeking local scientific advancement to enhance national agendas
such as economic competitiveness and foreign policy goals) [13,14].
From the “globalism” perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic saw calls
for closer multi-country collaboration to expedite data sharing
[1517]. Indeed, the international research community  including
academic, health, industry, and professional groups  collaborated
from the outset, through early exchange of laboratory and surveil-
lance data, genome sequences, and information on clinical outcomes
[18,19]. A bibliometric analysis found that the proportion of scientific
articles published in the first five months of 2020 that wereinternational collaborations was higher than the historical average
[14]. Such collaboration was possible even between researchers in
countries where political cooperation was strained, such as America
and China [20,21], although it has more recently been threatened by
arguments over the origins of SARS-CoV-2 [22]. Despite these exam-
ples of success, there is much more that could have been done in sev-
eral key areas as discussed below:
Collaborative research. Gaps in international research collaboration
have led to duplication of efforts. While there could be value in diverse
approaches, multiple trials with similar conditions have been conducted
on the efficacy of products such as hydroxychloroquine even after they
were shown to be ineffective [23,24]. There have been successes, such
as the WHO Solidarity Trial, which includes over 30 countries [25], but
it had to overcome numerous administrative hurdles in each country.
At the same time there have been fewer empirical studies exploring
the effectiveness of interventions of immediate policy relevance such as
face coverings and testing, quarantine and isolation protocols [24],
although some trials of interventions to increase uptake of protective
measures such as face coverings have been conducted. International dif-
ferences in policies also offer great scope for natural experiments, such
as through the econometric studies described below.
Major research funders could convene a process to facilitate
advanced agreement on generic protocols and streamline ethics and
regulatory approvals. Such a process might also explore the scope for
greater international harmonisation of such processes outside an emer-
gency. Multinational clinical trials regulation (such as that developed by
the EU) could help circumvent redundancies and obstacles [26].
International exchange of experiences. During COVID-19, there
has been inadequate learning from other countries’ experiences. In
some cases, policymakers may simply have been unaware of what
was being done elsewhere. This has been addressed by several
regional initiatives, such as the COVID Health System Response Moni-
tor created by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Poli-
cies, which collates information on policies adopted across the WHO
European Region [27]. Policy response in different countries are now
being tracked [28], and econometric studies have been conducted to
examine their impact on transmission [29,30].
Data sharing. Public repositories have been created to present com-
parable indicators of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as cases by country
and genomic data on variants. However, these resources are only as
good as data provided by countries. Many countries require investment
in disease surveillance infrastructure, including vital registration and
laboratories. Here, donors and development agencies can play a role,
ideally in a coordinated manner to avoid creating incompatible systems.
However, countries may be less enthusiastic about sharing information
if they are denied access to the fruit of their contributions. For example,
WHO shared avian influenza virus sequencing data received from Indo-
nesia to a pharmaceutical company, which then sold the vaccine to tar-
get this sequence back to the country. Indonesia subsequently decided
to suspend information sharing with the WHO [31]. It is therefore
important to incentivise all countries to participate in data sharing by
ensuring equitable access to life-saving technologies in exchange for
expanded global surveillance knowledge.
Innovation economics offers valuable insights on the benefits of
knowledge interchange [32], although so far it has received more atten-
tion in discussions on national rather than international development.
This field sees knowledge, rather than the more traditional accumula-
tion of capital, as a primary driver of economic growth. This is borne
out by empirical analyses, such as the growth of the German biotech
sector, from which one of the COVID-19 vaccines emerged [33]. The lit-
erature on innovation economics emphasises the importance of tacit
knowledge, regimes and policies that encourage entrepreneurship and
innovation, technological spillovers between collaborative firms, and
systems of innovation that create innovative environments. Despite the
economic case however, multilateral collaboration faces political chal-













1. Research and development
Naonal and mullateral financing 
of vaccine research and development
2. Intellectual property rights
Governance of patents and other 
intellectual property rights, as well as 
producon know-how
4. Manufacture and Purchasing
Manufacture of vaccines (including “at risk” 
producon before clinical trial results are 
known) and procurement deals
3. Supply and distribuon
Worldwide distribuon and deployment 
of COVID-19 vaccines
Figure 1. Key elements of national and multilateral COVID-19 vaccine strategies to ensure access to COVID-19 vaccines.
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Vaccines have been a key intervention in many PHEICs (including
pandemic influenza, polio, Ebola and COVID-19). The speed and
inclusivity of their rollout depends on interactions between countries
and other actors across several domains, including research and
development, supply and distribution, intellectual property rights
and manufacture and purchasing (see Figure 1).
Research and development. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen
rapid discovery and development of new vaccines, assisted by several
factors, including data sharing (such as the genetic sequence of SARS-
CoV-2 even before the WHO declaration of a PHEIC) and targeted
research funding by governments, acting alone or through multina-
tional bodies.
In this pandemic, the main multinational mechanism to finance
vaccine development has been the Coalition of Epidemic Prepared-
ness Innovations (CEPI), a non-profit foundation pooling resources
from several national and transnational donors to fund leading
COVID-19 vaccine candidates. By pooling resources, CEPI can strike
more procurement deals than can most individual countries, thus
spreading the risks of failure, mitigating supply chain disruptions,
increasing leverage on pricing and distribution, and allocating vac-
cines to maximise global benefit.
However, bringing new vaccines to market requires substantial
funding for research and development [34,35]. Furthermore, multi-
national efforts such as CEPI have been dwarfed by spending on vac-
cine development by individual high-income countries acting on
their own [36,37]. The most well-known is the US Government’s
Operation Warp Speed, a public-private partnership to fund COVID-
19 diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, which invested well over
US$10bn in development of COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics and
diagnostics [38]. In comparison, the EU’s Horizon 2020 special
COVID-19 grant scheme had awarded under €1 billion through
March 2021 for a wide range of research and operational activities
including developing vaccines [39]. However, EU-based vaccine
research also received support from national funders, so it is unclear
whether, in aggregate, the total investment matched the level in the
US. What is certain is that EU spending was more diffuse, and less
often earmarked for vaccines.Countries such as the US and UK that acted unilaterally may appear
to have been more successful than multilateral efforts, such as those
led by the EU or CEPI. However, unilateral vaccine investment is only
possible for large, well-resourced countries. Multilateral cooperation
has several benefits. Firstly, even for well-resourced countries, backing
national champions could create inefficiencies. Second, it allows coun-
tries to pool risk, so that an individual country is not dependent on the
success of a single candidate it backs. Thirdly, it reduces the depen-
dency of less-resourced countries on the willingness of well-resourced
countries to share intellectual property and/or donate vaccine doses
after a vaccine is developed and their own populations are vaccinated.
Manufacture and purchasing. In early 2021, vaccine production
capacity within the EU was insufficient to meet local demand, let
alone demand elsewhere. This was partly the consequence of the
EU’s relative lack of focus on production in its initial vaccine invest-
ment, and insufficiently tight contractual guarantees from producers.
To improve cooperation and expedite political decision making, the
EU established the Health Emergency Response Authority (HERA) in
2021, mirroring the US’s Biomedical Advanced Research and Devel-
opment Authority (BARDA), which was able to invest quickly and
directly in vaccine developers early in the pandemic as part of Opera-
tion Warp Speed.
Supply and distribution. Vaccine development is only the first
step; vaccines then need to be distributed worldwide. In 2020, global
demand for COVID-19 vaccines greatly exceeded supply [40,41].
While the supply situation improved in 2021 [42], the pressure may
worsen as additional vaccines are authorized, and countries consider
vaccinating younger people and using booster doses or reformulated
vaccines to tackle new variants.
Vaccine developers received at least US$10bn in public and non-
profit funding [36]. However, funding was not usually tied to interna-
tional agreements about vaccine distribution. This has resulted in
international competition around procurement, inefficient distribu-
tion, and even threats to block vaccine supplies from export [43].
This was a wasted opportunity as public funders could have arranged
for companies accepting funding to license and share their technolo-
gies widely to enable large-scale manufacture and distribution [36].
There is still the opportunity to do this for second generation COVID-
19 vaccines as well as in future pandemics.
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demand, market dynamics would dictate that supply flows to coun-
tries most able to pay high prices for vaccines, while poorer countries
lose out. An alternative would be to set up a multinational agreement
to allocate doses according to need, although the optimal way to do
so is not straightforward. Most COVID-19-related deaths have been
in high-income countries, although the disparity narrows when tak-
ing into account under-reporting [44]. However, other considerations
besides deaths have been proposed to guide prioritisation, including
years of life lost, reducing socioeconomic harms and returning to full
functioning [45]. Such considerations would suggest that poorer
countries should receive far more doses if allocation was optimal.
However, initiatives to achieve more equitable supply of vaccines
have had only limited traction so far. The COVAX Facility is a multilat-
eral initiative designed to procure COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of all
participating countries and then supply them to countries in propor-
tion to population, with doses for the poorest countries funded by
donors [5]. Although a laudable initiative, COVAX faced shortfalls in
funding commitments compared to its target of US$2.6bn [46]. In a
supply constrained environment, producers earmarked most doses
to high-income countries (including the UK and many EU member-
states) able to make financial commitments in advance [47] since
COVAX lacked binding mechanisms to enforce principles and rules
around global allocation. For example, by June 2021, high-income
countries had ordered 6bn vaccine doses, while COVAX had only
secured 2.3b [48]. COVAX’s inability to procure more doses has forced
it to impose commitment agreements on purchasing countries which
make it difficult for them to rely exclusively on COVAX for their vac-
cine supplies; these commitment agreements incentivise national
governments to negotiate directly with manufacturers instead of
relying solely on COVAX arrangements.
Intellectual property rights. One approach to attain equitable
vaccine rollout is to facilitate access to intellectual property and
expertise related to COVID-19 vaccines by poorer countries so that
the capacity to produce vaccines is more widespread. The United
States’ support for a temporary intellectual property waiver for
COVID-19 vaccines is a milestone in this endeavour [40]. However,
European and other countries with vaccine manufacturing capacity
have opposed such an approach on the basis that it will weaken
incentives for future drug development, and that regulatory and
technical issues are greater barriers than intellectual property. This
underscores that patent waivers would need to be accompanied by
sharing of technical knowledge to be successful in expanding produc-
tion capacity.
Several other mechanisms have been proposed to complement or
replace intellectual property waivers in facilitating more widespread
access to vaccine production capacity. COVAX could purchase the rel-
evant technology and then commission its manufacture on behalf of
participating countries, or COVAX could invest in manufacturing
capacity expansion similar to grants to manufacturers provided by
the EU and US. A more limited option is for vaccine developers to
license vaccine candidates for manufacturing by organisations in
other countries (such as the agreement between AstraZeneca and the
Serum Institute of India [38]), and adjuvants to developers to opti-
mise vaccine manufacturing [49]. Initiatives to reduce bottlenecks in
raw materials, harmonise regulatory processes and improve supply
chain resilience have also been proposed [50]. Strong multilateral
organisations like WHO and the World Trade Organization are
needed to provide guidance, allocate tasks, and encourage commit-
ments of solidarity from countries to do their parts for the benefit of
the global community.
The alternative to seeking to make vaccines widely available as a
global common pool resource is to maximise national self-interest.
However, this leads to worse outcomes for everyone. Firstly, it pre-
vents efficiencies in manufacturing, since raw materials and supply
chains for vaccine manufacture are global in nature. Few countriesare self-reliant for all needed manufacturing inputs [51], let alone the
research and development effort needed to bring innovations to pop-
ulations. Trade barriers around export of vaccines and raw materials
for vaccine manufacture have already threatened efficient vaccine
production and distribution. Secondly, unequal vaccine access pre-
vents the world economy and trade from recovery. By one estimate,
lack of cooperation around COVID-19 vaccine production and distri-
bution could cost up to US$9.2trn in global economic growth [52],
with a substantial share borne by high-income countries. It also
increases the risk of variants emerging in hotspots that threaten vac-
cine effectiveness globally [7]. In comparison, the IMF estimates that
the cost of vaccinating at least 60% of the population in every country
by 2022 would cost $50bn [53]. Yet the current level of funding of
COVAX is insufficient to achieve this target.
6. Travel policies
Every country imposed some form of travel restrictions in 2020,
making them the most extensive travel restrictions in history [54].
The impact of these restrictions on SARS-CoV-2 spread has been
mixed. The cordon sanitaire imposed on Wuhan in February 2020
was too late to prevent spread to other Chinese cities [55,56]. How-
ever, international restrictions probably played a role in delaying
spread to countries in early 2020 [55,57]. Several Asia-Pacific coun-
tries were able to maintain low COVID-19 incidence throughout 2020
using strong travel restrictions combined with other non-pharma-
ceutical interventions [58]. Conversely, regions that were slow to
impose such restrictions (such as Europe and North America) faced
large COVID-19 outbreaks.
WHO was reluctant to support travel restrictions when it declared
COVID-19 a PHEIC, having to balance disease mitigation with the
social, economic, and legal consequences of these measures, includ-
ing the flow of supplies needed to mitigate COVID-19 [59]. The travel
and tourism sector lost an estimated 143m jobs and $3.8trn in pro-
duction in 2020 [60]. International Health Regulations dictate that
travel restrictions during emergencies should be driven by evidence
[55,61]. Evidence suggests that such restrictions are most useful
when COVID-19 incidence (and incidence of variants of concern) in
destination countries is low; travel restrictions imposed by countries
already facing high COVID-19 incidence may have had little effect on
epidemic dynamics [62]. However, this principle has not always been
applied in practice.
The need for travel restrictions despite their economic cost is
especially great when there are highly connected states with disso-
nant COVID-19 response strategies. Examples include Sweden and
Finland [63], and Russia and China [64]. Expedient closing of borders
can mitigate asynchronous pandemic waves and variant spread
between countries, but within the EU this encounters legal con-
straints [65]. Furthermore, citizens have been reluctant to accept loss
of freedom of movement across the EU, particularly given the con-
stantly changing travel rules. One potential implication for the EU is
that free movement brings with it obligations to align health policies.
This may be challenging in countries such as Sweden which have
pursued different COVID-19 response policies from many of its
neighbours. Harmonising vaccine delivery strategies (and not just
procurement) may be one area that can achieve greater epidemiolog-
ical convergence within the EU, and is arguably within its public
health competence. A further challenge is that countries differ in
terms of economic resilience and reliance on international travel, so
regional policy harmonisation may require solidarity mechanisms to
support countries economically hardest hit.
On a global level, International Health Regulations may allow evi-
dence-based travel policy coordination that is enshrined in legal
commitments to enhance trust between nations. However, these reg-
ulations were violated by many of the trade and travel restrictions
enacted during the pandemic. There has also been a lack of
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For instance, the UK’s decision in July 2021 to require quarantine
from French travellers who were fully vaccinated, could have
stemmed from a misreading of GISAID data [66]. Consequently, the
WHO has called for stronger legal commitments between nations to
enhance international trust [4].
As the pandemic eases in parts of the world, travel instruments
such as vaccine or immunity certificates have been proposed, and in
some cases, implemented (e.g., the EU Digital COVID Certificate), to
support a safe return to cross-border travel [67]. In its present form,
the introduction of these instruments has been highly fragmented,
with different governments and private sector entities launching sep-
arate versions, and no international agreement over inter-operability
of record-keeping. WHO has outlined some recommendations to
facilitate their inter-operability across countries but opposes making
COVID-19 vaccination the sole and mandatory condition for cross-
border travel [68]. A further concern is that vaccination may not pre-
vent a traveller from being infected by an immune escape variant.
Differing views around the ethical acceptability of vaccine certifica-
tion may result in political tensions if countries develop independent
policies without seeking international consensus [69].7. Conclusion and future steps
The actions of the EU during the pandemic illustrate the tension
between short-term nationalistic incentives and long-term impera-
tives for cooperation towards achieving global public goods. The EU
is viewed by some as a credible model for regional cooperation [70],
and has shown examples of good governance, including its leadership
in developing a pandemic treaty ahead of the next global threat [71].
However, it has struggled to balance preferences of individual mem-
ber-states (and those of their political leaderships), with the collec-
tive interests of all member-states. Such tensions are especially
challenging when health care and health policy issues are involved,
given how these have hitherto remained largely the responsibility of
the member-states. In a pandemic, this can lead to inertia and politi-
cal indecisiveness at the EU level, with member-states filling the gap
with potentially contradictory or competing decisions.
Infectious disease threats will continue to emerge, including new
variants of SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens with pandemic poten-
tial. The post-COVID-19 world must overcome the serious setbacks
from the pandemic to hard-fought progress in reducing poverty and
inequality. Health infrastructure and human resources have been
overburdened and will take many years to recover, particularly if
governments impose austerity measures as they seek to recover from
fiscal expansion during the pandemic.
Strong multilateral collaboration seems necessary for the world to
absorb these shocks [2]. Pandemics are opportunities to reimagine
governance structures and learn from previous experiences [1].
COVID-19 and previous pandemics have shown the importance of
multilateral collaboration in diverse areas, including research and
knowledge sharing, discovery, development and distribution of vac-
cines, and travel restrictions. Beyond infectious diseases, multina-
tional health infrastructure will be vital to tackle the consequences of
other global determinants of disease such as climate change and food
insecurity. However, as noted above, effective multilateral action is
based on certain principles, not all of which may have been fully
accepted. Many of the benefits of multilateral collaboration are indi-
visible and the principle of diffuse reciprocity requires that relation-
ships are based on trust. Yet this has often been in short supply,
leading some countries to take a narrowly transactional approach to
collaboration, such as the UK’s restriction of exports of medicines
while benefiting from vaccines manufactured in the EU. It also
requires acceptance of mutual responsibility, for example not topursue policies that allow the spread of the virus to one’s neighbours,
accompanied by an appropriate dispute settlement process. The
absence of such a system has left some governments with no option
other than to impose travel restrictions, with the attendant economic
consequences.
Our scorecard highlights that multilateral efforts during the
COVID-19 pandemic faced challenges such as balancing national and
international incentives, as well as developing agile coordination
mechanisms that can react rapidly (Table 1). Hence it is important to
prepare before emergencies arise, and to develop mechanisms that
are robust to political and other unpredictable changes.
Concerted global cooperation is possible, as witnessed by the
development of legally binding frameworks like the International
Health Regulations. Strengthened governance of multilateral insti-
tutions is essential, with mechanisms in which countries contrib-
ute according to their ability and obtain support according to
their need [72].
Europe is already setting an example. The EU has set out a vision
for closer working among its 27 member-states, based on the concept
of a European Health Union [73]. One element has been establishing
HERA. Although its precise role is as yet uncertain, it may include risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication and will sup-
port horizon scanning, technological innovation, and monitoring and
support for emergency preparedness [74]. However, it will also have
to find ways to collaborate closely with other agencies within the EU,
such as the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as well as those in
the UN system, including the WHO. Meanwhile, the WHO European
Region, with its 53 member-states, has established a Pan European
Commission on Health and Sustainable Development, which has pro-
posed a comprehensive set of measures at the European and global
level, centred on the concept of One Health, that seek to improve the
ability to anticipate, prevent, and, where necessary, respond rapidly,
including release of financial resources, to a future crisis [75]. Health
is also rising up the agenda in regional blocs outside Europe [76] and
it seems likely that similar initiatives will emerge elsewhere.
Search strategy and selection criteria
To inform this Health Policy article, we conducted a PubMed
search for peer-reviewed literature using the key words
((SARS-Cov-2[MeSH Terms]) OR (COVID-19[MeSH Terms]))
AND ((cooperation[Title/Abstract]) OR (collaboration[Title/
Abstract])). All relevant results until 7 May 2021 were included
and no language restrictions were applied. Other relevant
articles were identified using a snowballing technique. All
descriptions of cooperation between countries, both in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and other emerging infec-
tious disease threats, were considered. Source types were
largely restricted to academic publications, although grey liter-
ature sources were also included, where relevant. We found 93
papers which met our inclusion criteria and identified 50 with
unique themes. Of these, 22 are cited in the main text, while
key insights and themes from the remaining 28 are summar-
ised in Supplementary Table 1.
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